Abstract. In this paper, we introduce Attribute-Based Signatures with User-Controlled Linkability (ABS-UCL). Attribute-based signatures allow a signer who has enough credentials/attributes to anonymously sign a message w.r.t. some public policy revealing neither the attributes used nor his identity. User-controlled linkability is a new feature which allows a user to make some of his signatures directed at the same recipient linkable while still retaining anonymity. Such a feature is useful for many reallife applications. We give a general framework for constructing ABS-UCL and present an efficient instantiation of the construction that supports multiple attribute authorities.
Introduction
Attribute-based cryptography can play a tremendous role in providing security to cloud computing, whether for privacy/access control (encryption) or for authentication (signatures). Attribute-based encryption [21, 35] is a natural generalization of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [34, 9, 13] and its subsequent fuzzy variant [35] in the sense that it enables fine-grained control of access to encrypted data.
Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS) [27] allow a signer owning a set of attributes to sign messages w.r.t. any public access policy satisfied by his attributes revealing neither his identity nor the set of attributes used in the signing. Attribute-based signatures proved to be a powerful primitive and many existing signature-related notions such as ring signatures [33] and group signatures [10] could be viewed as special cases of attributebased signatures. For a comparison with other primitives, we refer to [30] . The authors in [30] also showed many application of ABS including attribute-based messaging [8] , trust negotiation [17] and leaking secrets.
Definition and Security of ABS-UCL
In this section, we define the notion of Attribute-Based Signatures with User-Controlled Linkability (ABS-UCL), and present its security requirements. Our notion supports multiple attribute authorities, each responsible for a subset of attributes.
Syntax of ABS-UCL
In an ABS-UCL scheme, we have a set AA = {AA i } n i=1 of attribute authorities, where A i is the space of attributes managed by attribute authority AA i . The universe of attributes is defined as A = n i=1 A i . Assume that A ⊂ A is a set of attributes for which a certain predicate Ω is satisfied, i.e. Ω(A) = 1. We have, a ∈ A ⇒ ∃A i , s.t. a ∈ A i , so attribute a is managed by attribute authority AA i . Below are the definitions of the algorithms used in an ABS-UCL scheme, where all algorithms (bar the first three) take as implicit input pp produced by Setup.
• Setup(1 λ ): On input a security parameter, it returns public parameters pp.
• AASetup(aid, pp): Is run locally by attribute authority AA aid to generate its public/secret key pair (vk AA , sk AA ). The authority publishes vk AA and keeps sk AA secret.
• UKeyGen(id, pp): Is run by user id to generate his personal secret key sk id .
• AttKeyGen(id, f (sk id ), a, sk AA ): Is run by attribute authority AA that is responsible for the attribute a, where f is an injective one-way function, it gives the user id the secret key sk id,a , bound to his identity id and f (sk id ).
• Sign(m, Ω, sk id , sk id,A , recip): If a user has enough attributes to satisfy the predicate Ω, i.e. Ω(A) = 1, then he uses the corresponding secrets keys sk id,A = {sk id,a i } a i ∈A to produce a valid signature σ = {σ ABS , σ UCL } on the message m and the recipient tag recip w.r.t. the predicate Ω; if recip = ⊥ then σ UCL =⊥.
• Verify(σ, {vk AA i } i , Ω, m, recip): Takes a signature σ on the message m and the possibly empty recipient tag recip w.r.t. a predicate Ω, the verification keys {vk AA i } i of the attribute authorities managing attributes involved in Ω, and returns 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
On input two signatures, two messages, two signing policies and the verification keys of the attribute authorities managing the attributes involved in the policies, and a recipient tag, it returns 1 if the signatures are valid on their respective messages and the same non-empty recipient tag recip (w.r.t. the respective policy), i.e. if recip =⊥ and (σ UCL0 = σ UCL1 = ⊥), and 0 otherwise.
• Identify(σ, m, recip, {vk AA i } i , Ω, sk): Is only used in the security model for capturing linkability. It checks whether the valid signature σ (w.r.t. the signing policy Ω) on the message m and the non-empty recipient tag recip was produced by the secret key sk, outputting 0/1 accordingly.
Security Definitions
We define here the security requirements of an ABS-UCL scheme.
Correctness. This requires that signatures produced by honest users verify correctly and that signatures produced by the same user to the same valid recipient (i.e. on the same non-empty recipient tag) link.
Linkability. As specified in [37] , there are two methods to support usercontrolled linkability in anonymous digital signatures: In the first, a designated linking authority can determine whether or not two signatures are linked; whereas in the second method, there exists a public linking algorithm which can be run by any party. Our model supports the latter. We require that only valid signatures directed at the same recipient and which were produced by the same user link. In the game the adversary can choose all the secret keys of the users and attribute authorities. The adversary outputs (
It wins if σ i is valid (w.r.t. Ω i ) on m i and recip i , for i = 1, 2 and either of the following holds:
• σ 1 was produced by sk 1 and σ 2 was produced by sk 2 where sk 1 = sk 2 and recip
• σ 1 was produced by sk 1 and σ 2 was produced by sk 2 where sk 1 = sk 2 and
, 2} and either recip k =⊥ or recip 1 = recip 2 .
• σ 1 was produced by sk 1 and σ 2 was produced by sk 2 where sk 1 = sk 2 and recip = recip 1 = recip 2 =⊥ and
In summary, this requires that signatures by the same user on the same non-empty recipient tag link. Also, signatures by different users but on the same recipient tag or those by the same user but on different recipient tags do not link.
Anonymity. This requires that a signature reveals neither the identity of the signer nor the attributes used in the signing. In the anonymity game, we have the following:
• Adversary's Capabilities: Full control over all attribute authorities. It can also ask for the secret keys of signers of its choice; those signers will be referred to as corrupt users. In addition, the adversary can ask for the secret key of any attribute and has a signing oracle that it can query on messages and recipient tags on behalf of honest users.
where Ω(A i ) = 1 for i = 0, 1. If recip =⊥ then we require that throughout the game (i.e. even after the challenge phase) id 0 and id 1 must be honest (i.e. their personal secret keys are not revealed to the adversary), and that neither of (id 0 , recip), (id 1 , recip) is queried to the signing oracle. This ensures that the adversary cannot trivially win by exploiting the linkability feature.
The adversary gets back a signature σ b produced using (id b , A b ) for b ← {0, 1}. After this, the adversary can continue accessing its oracles as long as it does not violate the above two conditions. • Adversary's Output: The adversary outputs its guess b * and wins if b * = b.
Unforgeability. This requires that users cannot output signatures on (message, recipient tag) pairs w.r.t. to a signing policy not satisfied by their set of attributes, even if they pool their attributes together, which ensures collusion-resistance. In addition, since our notion supports usercontrolled linkability, we additionally require that an adversary cannot produce signatures which link to other signatures by an honest user, i.e. one whose personal secret key has not been revealed to the adversary, even if all other users and attribute authorities in the system are corrupt. Note that, unlike in DAA, e.g. [2, 3] , in our notion even if a user's personal secret key is revealed, only signatures on non-empty recipient tags by the user can be traced, i.e. it is impossible to trace signatures on empty recipient tags.
In the unforgeability game, we have the following:
• Adversary's Capabilities: Access to a signing oracle. Moreover, it can corrupt any attribute authority. We refer to the non-corrupted attribute authorities as honest ones. It can also ask for the personal secret key of any user. We refer to the non-corrupted users as honest ones. It can also ask for the secret key for any attribute.
• Winning Conditions: The adversary wins if either:
• Adversary outputs a valid signature σ on m and recip w.r.t. Ω, where (m, recip, Ω) was not queried to the signing oracle, and there exists no subset of attributes A * whose keys have been revealed to the adversary or managed by corrupt attribute authorities s.t. Ω(A * ) = 1. In other words, ∀A * s.t. Ω(A * ) = 1, ∃a * ∈ A * s.t. Ω(A * \ {a * }) = 0 and a * 's key has never been revealed to the adversary and it is managed by an honest attribute authority.
, where σ 0 is valid on m 0 and recip w.r.t. Ω 0 , σ 1 is valid on m 1 and recip w.r.t.
was not queried to the signing oracle. Note here the adversary has more freedom than it has in the anonymity game because it is allowed to ask for signatures by the honest user it intends to frame on any recipient tag.
Building Blocks
Bilinear Groups. A bilinear group is a tuple P = (
where G 1 , G 2 and G T are groups of a prime order p and g 1 and g 2 generate G 1 and G 2 , respectively. The function e is a non-degenerate bilinear map
According to [19] , prime-order bilinear groups can be categorized into three main types. We will use Type-3 where G 1 = G 2 and no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G 1 and G 2 are known. This type is considered to be more efficient than Type-2, and definitely more efficient than Type-1, when the latter is implemented over fields of large prime characteristic. 4 Digital Signatures. We require a Digital Signature (DS) scheme that is correct and existentially unforgeable. In our construction realised in the ROM, we will use different variants of the full Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [6] . We refer to original full Boneh-Boyen scheme as the BB scheme, whereas we refer to its modified variant originally defined in [6] , and used in, e.g. [12] , as the BB † scheme. Both schemes are secure under the q-SDH assumption.
) be the description of a bilinear group and h 1 ∈ G 1 is a random element. The schemes are described below:
. The secret key is (x, y) and the verification key is (X, Y ).
• BB.Sign(sk, m): To sign m ∈ Z p , choose r ← Z p such that x+ry+m = 0 and compute the signature σ = g 1/(x+ry+m) 1
. In the BB † scheme, the signature is σ = (g 1 · h z 1 ) 1/(x+ry+m) , where the BB † signer need not know the value z.
• Verify(vk, m, σ): if e(σ, X · Y r · g m 2 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) output 1, otherwise 0. In the BB † scheme, the verification equation is e(σ,
Linkable Indistinguishable Tags. A Linkable Indistinguishable Tag (LIT) scheme [3] is similar to a Message Authentication Code (MAC) but requires different security properties. It consists of a couple of algorithms KeyGen and Tag. The former, on input a security parameter, produces a secret key sk, whereas the latter, on input a message m and the secret key, outputs a tag. Besides correctness, the security of LIT [3] requires Linkability and fIndistinguishability. Linkability requires that an adversary who is allowed to control both the secret key and the message cannot produce equal tags unless they are tags on the same message/key pair. Indistinguishability, which is defined w.r.t. a one-way function f of the secret key, requires that an adversary who gets f (sk) and access to a tag oracle, cannot determine whether or not a new tag on a message of its choice was produced using the same key used by the tag oracle.
As in [3] , we instantiate the LIT in the ROM with the Boneh-LynnShacham (BLS) signature scheme [7] . The LIT instantiation is secure under the DDH and the discrete logarithm problems [3] . Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Let R be an NP relation on pairs (x, y) with a corresponding language L R = {y | ∃ x s.t.(x, y) ∈ R}. A NIZK proof system Π for a relation R is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, Prove, Verify, Extract, SimSetup, SimProve) defined as follows: Setup outputs a reference string crs and an extraction key xk which allows for witness extraction. On input (crs, x, y), Prove outputs a proof π if R(x, y) = 1. On input (crs, y, π), Verify outputs 1 if π is a valid proof that y ∈ L R , and 0 otherwise. Extract outputs the witness x from a valid proof π. Finally, SimSetup outputs a simulated reference string crs sim and a trapdoor tr, which is used by SimProve to simulate proofs without a witness.
We require: completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge. Completeness requires that honestly generated proofs are accepted; Soundness requires that it is infeasible to produce a convincing proof for a false statement; Zero-knowledge requires that a proof reveals no information about the witness used. For formal definitions refer to [4] .
In our construction in the random oracle model, we use the FiatShamir transformation [16] applied to interactive Σ-protocols.
Span Programs. A span program [24] is defined as follows: Definition 1. Given a monotone boolean function Φ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, a l×t matrix M with entries in a field F, and a labelling function a : [l] → [n] that associates M 's rows to Φ's input variables. We say that M is a monotone span program for φ over a field F if for every (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , we have the following:
Framework for ABS with User-Controlled Linkability
Overview of the Framework.The tools we use in our generic construction are: a NIZK system Π that is sound and zero-knowledge, two existentially unforgeable signature schemes DS 1 and DS 2 , a collision-resistant hash function H and a f -indistinguishable linkable indistinguishable tag scheme LIT. The Setup algorithm of ABS-UCL generates the common reference string crs for the NIZK system Π. It also generates a key pair (vk psdo , sk psdo ) for the digital signature schemes DS 2 . The public parameters of the system is set to pp = (crs, vk psdo , A, H), where A is the universe of attributes. For a new attribute authority to join the system, it creates a secret/verification key pair (sk aid , vk aid ) for signature scheme DS 1 . To generate a signing key for attribute a ∈ A for signer id, the managing attribute authority signs the signer identity along with the attribute and the image of the one-way function on his secret key, i.e. (id,a, f (sk id )), using sk aid . The resulting signature is used as the secret key for that attribute by signer id.
To sign a message m w.r.t. a signing policy Ω, there are two cases; if the signature is linkable (i.e. on a non-empty recipient tag recip =⊥), the signer first uses LIT and his secret key to compute a tag σ UCL on the recipient name recip and a NIZK proof π that such a tag verifies w.r.t. his personal secret key sk id , and that he either has a digital signature on a pseudo-attribute (following [30, 14] ), i.e. the hash of the combination of the signing predicate, the message and the recipient name recip, i.e. a psdo = H (Ω, m, recip) , that verifies w.r.t. the verification key vk psdo or that she has enough credentials (DS 1 signatures on (id, f (sk id ), a i ) ) to satisfy the original signing predicate Ω. For non-linkable signatures (i.e. when recip =⊥), it suffices to produce a NIZK proof that the signer has enough attributes to satisfy the modified predicate, i.eΩ = Ω ∨ a psdo , and therefore, no need for the linking part that uses LIT. Note that in this case a psdo = H(Ω, m).
Before we define the languages for the NIZK proofs L 1 for linkable and L 2 for non-linkable signatures, we will generically define the format of these languages, where the secret values, aka witnesses for proofs, are underlined:
L : (public values pv), (witness w) : R i (pv, w)
• Linkable signatures (recip = ⊥):
We use a span program (Section 3) to prove the satisfiability of the extended predicateΩ. Using a public matrix M, the signer needs to prove the ownership of a secret vector v ∈ Z The zero elements in this vector v corresponds to attributes that the signer does not actually need in order to satisfy the predicate. For these values, the signer can safely choose random signatures. For the non-zero elements in v, the signer needs to prove ownership of their corresponding attributes/pseudo-attribute.
The hiding property of the Π system ensures that the proof π does not reveal how the modified predicateΩ was satisfied.
The pseudo-attribute is used for two reasons; firstly, it binds the signature to the message, the signing predicate, and the recipient name recip if the the signature is linkable. Secondly, the secret signing key sk psdo for the digital signature scheme DS will be used as a trapdoor in the security proofs to allow its holder to simulate signatures and sign on behalf of any signer without knowing their secret keys. That could be done by producing a signature on the pseudo-attribute associated with the message and the signing predicate.
The full proof for the following Theorem is in the full version.
Theorem 1. The generic construction of the attribute-based signature with user-controlled linkability ABS-UCL given above is secure if the underlying building blocks are secure.
A Concrete Construction of ABS-UCL
Description of the Construction. The signer's task is to provide a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π w.r.t. the languages defined earlier, i.e. L 1 and L 2 , depending on whether or not the signature is linkable. We instantiate DS 1 using the BB † scheme and DS 2 using the BB scheme. The proof will be made of 3 parts (or 2 if non-linkable). The first deals with the Span program to show how to hide which subset of attributes the signer has used to satisfy the modified predicateΩ. For this, the signer proves that he has used a secret vector v to span the public matrix M ∈ Z α×θ p of the span program, where α = |Ω|. The second part is to show that the signatures verify correctly w.r.t. their corresponding verification keys, where the span program can safely let the signer choose random signatures for the attributes which he does not own/want to use. The third part is to show that, when the signature is supposed to be linkable, the linking part indeed uses the same user secret key used in the rest of the proof. Not that the group elements used later in the commitments, i.e. k 1 , k 2 and k 3 are parts of the public parameters pp whereas sk is the signer's secret key.
Part 1: Span program
Prove that vM = [1, 0, . . . , 0], this can be done by proving the following:
•
• Proof of Statement
Part 2: DS 1 and DS 2 Now each verification equation is as follows:
DS 1 is instantiated using the BB † scheme whereas DS 2 is instantiated using the BB scheme. The signatures are as follows:
pseudo-attributes
Where the public keys of an attribute a i is the couple of group elements
2 . The identity of the signer is id and his secret key is sk. In order to use the secret vector v to hide the subset of attributes used to satisfy the predicate Ω, we can simply raise each σ a i to its corresponding vector value v i , when v i is zero, the signer does not want to this attribute, and therefore he can replace the signature by a random value.
• Commitments of (σ a i , r i ), i ∈ [1, α] and the signer identity id:
and compute:
Let, ∀i ∈ [1, α − 1] : ρ i = ρ r i + ρ id whereas ρ α = ρ rα .
• Simplification: (can be done by both prover and verifier)
• Knowledge of Exponents ∀i ∈ [1, α] and ∀j ∈ [1, θ], compute:
, compute:
Part 3:Linkability-LIT The signer needs to prove the following equation:
If the signature is linkable, then compute:
Finally, compute the challenge c:
M ij )/e(g 1 , g 2 ) · e(Z, g 2 ) j = 1
• ∀j ∈ [1, θ]:
• For the linkablility:
• If σ UCL = ⊥, then compute:
• Verify thatĉ = c and that the following statement holds: The full proof for the following Theorem is in the full version.
Theorem 2. The construction is secure in the random oracle model if the q-SDH, DDH and Dlog assumptions hold, and the hash function H is collision resistant.
Comparison
In Table 1 , we compare the properties offered by our notion with those offered by related attribute-based signature notions. We note that the size of the signature of our concrete construction, which uses Type-3 bilinear groups is G , where θ is the number of columns in the span program matrix M.
Our main concern in this paper was efficiency, hence the use of random oracles. There are alternative building blocks in the literature to instantiate ABS-UCL in the standard model.
